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INTRODUCTION

CHALLENGES TO U.S. INTERESTS
Challenges to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia during the 1990s may well be a matter of definition as a new security environment takes shape. While global war against the Soviet Union fades as the rationale for an American presence in the Pacific, the new rationale may become regional threats to international commerce and access to natural resources, production facilities, and markets. Is this a credible substitute that will justify maintaining forward-deployed forces? In the abstract, probably not. It is difficult to imagine plausible scenarios in which any regional actor, including Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union, would choose to obstruct international commerce or attempt to deny access to important centers of production and resources.
In the absence of specific threats, an active U.S. presence in the Asian-Pacific region would seem to rest on the belief that, without it, other countries with questionable intentions might vie for regional dominance. In Southeast Asia, Japan is the focus of such concern. An extension of Tokyo's naval deployments south of the Bashi channel 
U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THEIR EFFORTS
American forces in the Pacific are configured around carrier battle groups whose strategic mission is to effect both sea control and sea denial. For the past three decades, this strategy was directed against the USSR. U.S. antisubmarine warfare systems (P-3s and SSNs) exercised Moreover, the American role of benign mentor may also be reduced.
EFFECTS OF A REDUCED U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE
In searching to replace the Soviet-American confrontation as the rationale for forward-deployed forces in the Pacific, the Defense Department now emphasizes the U.S. role as regional balancer, honest broker, and security guarantor. But, whether these concepts will be acceptable either to the U.S. public during an era of tight budgets or to the countries of the region at a time of rising nationalism remains to be seen. 24
It is useful to recall that ASEAN was formed in 1967 so that its members could avoid being drawn into the Cold War division that had 
